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AFTER TEN YEARS,
SARBANES-OXLEY MIGHT BE
STATUTORY OVERKILL
Harvey Gilmore*

I. INTRODUCTION

T

he start of the twenty-first century brought with it some
spectacular corporate accounting scandals: Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco, to name a few. The subsequent
congressional hearings investigating the accounting and ethical
failures of these companies resulted in a parade of one corporate
executive after another claiming they had no knowledge of the
massive fraud in their firms. In response to this rapid-fire
succession of corporate scandals, Congress enacted the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”). 1 It is a statute first introduced by
Senator Paul Sarbanes and Congressman Michael Oxley, and
signed into law by President George W. Bush in July 2002. 2 The
two major problem areas that SOX sought to remedy were
personal accountability of corporate managers and that of auditor
independence. As a result, SOX created the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), 3 an administrative
agency charged with the responsibility of establishing audit
standards for publicly traded companies.
In this essay, I will argue that there are some provisions
* Professor of Taxation and Business Law at Monroe College, The Bronx,
New York; B.S., Hunter College of the City University of New York (1987),
M.S., Long Island University (1990), J.D., Southern New England School of
Law (1998), LL.M., Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (2005). I
deeply thank the wonderful editors for their help, generosity and friendship in
publishing this article.
1
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
2
Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations,
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31, 2002, at A1, available at Factiva, Doc. No.
nytf000020020731dy7v00039.
3
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §101, 15 U.S.C. §7211, (2002).
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within SOX that wrongfully make the innocent suffer for the
guilty. I will first look at Section 206, which prohibits an auditor
from taking a position with a client for at least one year after
participating in an audit of that same client. I will next look at
Section 203, which requires that an auditing firm rotate its
partner if it worked with a specific client for the previous five
years. Finally, I will look at Section 304, which requires the Chief
Executive Officer (“CEO”) and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”)
of a publicly traded corporation to disgorge their profits if the
financial statements must be restated due to fraud. In doing so, I
do not mean to suggest that enacting SOX was unnecessary or
unsuccessful; I am merely pointing out that even a right motive
can sometimes yield a harshly wrong result.

II. AUDITOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
UNDER SECTION 206
An auditor has always been required to be independent
from the client whose financial records the auditor examines. An
auditor cannot be an advocate for the client’s position,4 like an
attorney would. An auditor, after examining the client’s books,
gives a professional opinion as to whether the client’s financial
statements give a fair representation of the client’s financial
position.5 Consequently, the auditor gives external users the
assurance that the financial statements are free of any material
misstatements or omissions that would perpetrate a fraud on the
investing public. 6
A. The Problem: Lack of Auditor Independence
A very large factor in the high profile cases of accounting
fraud was that that auditing firms (and audit partners) enjoyed
close relationships with the clients whose records were being
audited. This arose from auditing firms offering additional
services to the same clients (tax preparation and management
consulting, among others).
This practice embedded the large audit firms in deeply
incestuous relationships with their clients, impairing their
4
Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 119, 124 (2006).
5
Id. at 125.
6
Id.
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independence. As examples, Ernst & Young developed a business
partnership with its client, PeopleSoft; some of KPMG’s illegal
tax shelters, for which it narrowly escaped criminal indictment,
were provided to clients and their audit committee members; and
both KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers owned investments in
their audit clients. Auditors also impaired their independence by
performing for audit clients non-audit services that generated
considerable revenue compared to audit revenue. Impaired
independence reduced auditors’ reputations as watchdogs, which
likely tempted many managers to indulge in accounting
aggressions. 7
As a matter of fact, Arthur Andersen (“Andersen”),
Enron’s not-so independent auditing firm, received $27 million in
tax and consulting fees in addition to $25 million in audit fees.
Those fees were paid by Arthur Andersen’s highest profile client,
Enron. 8
Sometimes, the relationship between the auditor and the
client can be closely personal as well. For example, when the
truth of Enron’s creative accounting practices came to light, it
also exposed the chummy relationship between Rick Causey and
David Duncan. “David Duncan and Rick Causey often
vacationed together, annually leading a group of Andersen and
Enron ‘co-workers’ on golfing trips to elite courses around the
country.” 9 Causey was Enron’s Chief Accounting Officer, and a
former partner at Arthur Andersen, which was Enron’s auditing
firm; Duncan was Andersen’s audit partner who handled the
Enron account. 10
Naturally, when one has a business arrangement
7
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Symposium: Litigation Reform Since the
PSLRA – A Ten Year Retrospective: Panel Two: Sarbanes-Oxley Accounting
Issues: Too Big To Fail – Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to
Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 17131714 (2006).
8
William O. Fisher, Lawyers Keep Out: Why Attorneys Should Not
Participate in Negotiating Financial Numbers Reported by Public Company
Clients, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1501, 1519, n.57 (2010) (It was “reported that in
the year 2000 Andersen was paid [by Enron] audit fees of approximately $25
million and nonaudit fees of approximately $27 million.”).
9
Matthew J. Barrett, In the Wake of Corporate Reform: One year in Life
of Sarbanes-Oxley – A Critical Review Symposium Issue: “Tax Services” as a
Trojan Horse In the Auditor Independence Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 463, 484 (2004).
10
Harvey Gilmore, This is Not a Symposium on How to Commit Fraud –
But, if it Were. . ., 11 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 199, 217 (2011).
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commingled with personal friendships, it could lead to a potential
situation where a person may have to choose between doing his
job right and potentially alienating his friend. “An auditor who
suspects errors or misstatements, whether intentional or not, must
choose, perhaps unconsciously, between harming a known
individual and likely the auditor’s own self-interest by
questioning the accounting, or injuring faceless others by failing
to object to the possibly incorrect numbers. Such biases only grow
stronger as personal relationships with the client’s management,
sometimes former auditing colleagues, deepen.” 11
B. The Solution: Sarbanes Oxley Section 206
Section 206 (1) of SOX provides the following:
It shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting
firm to perform for an issuer any audit service required
by this title, if a chief executive officer, controller, chief
financial officer, chief accounting officer, or any person
serving in an equivalent position for the issuer, was
employed by that registered independent public
accounting firm and participated in any capacity in the
audit of that issuer during the 1-year period preceding
the date of the initiation of the audit. 12
In order to ensure that there is complete independence
from the client, Section 206 of SOX expressly prohibits an auditor
from taking any accounting related job with that same client if
the auditor recently participated in an audit of that client in any
capacity. 13 The statutory cooling off period requires that the
auditor wait for a minimum of one year after concluding the
audit before taking an accounting job with the client. 14
C. One Potential Injustice of Section 206
For purposes of Section 206, what does the phrase “in any
capacity” really mean? In the normal sense, participating in an
audit in any capacity refers to an auditor checking various
Barrett, supra note 9, at 484. See also, Max H. Bazerman, George
Lowenstein, and Don A. Moore, Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, 80
HARV. BUS. REV. 97, 100 (2002).
12
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §206, 15 U.S.C. §78k(f) (2002).
13
Id.
14
Id.
11
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aspects of a client’s financial practices. The auditor will look at
things like the client’s general ledgers, bank reconciliations,
cancelled checks, tax records, and payroll records, among
others. 15
If one takes the phrase “in any capacity” literally, then it
means just that . . . anything that an individual does within the
scope of an audit can now trigger Section 206 to that person’s
detriment. For example, an accountant who is working on his
very first audit might just make tick marks in the daily audit plan
to show that everything on that day’s schedule has been
accounted for. Or there might be someone whose only function is
to file paperwork. Or, there might be a rookie accountant who is
on an audit as an observer, and his job is to get coffee and
doughnuts for the rest of the team.
If “in any capacity” is taken literally, Section 206 lends
itself to this unjust result: For example, I am young accountant
who takes a job in the audit department of a public accounting
firm. I work with the firm for six months, and I actually
participate in an audit. I was never in any kind of executive
decision-making capacity whatsoever. My only audit duty is to
look at the client’s cancelled checks to make sure that they are
countersigned by both the controller and chief financial officer,
pursuant to the client’s internal control policy. I go through a
sample of 1000 checks, and I find that each check has both
required signatures, which I properly document and report to the
audit partner. This is my only exposure to doing audit work.
A short while later, the client offers me a job in the client’s
tax department, and I love doing tax work much more than I
liked auditing. I would prepare income tax returns, sales tax
returns, and property tax returns (as I actually did in my
accounting days). As such, my immediate supervisors would be
the controller and chief financial officer. Not only would I be a
mid-level employee who would not be in a financial oversight
position, but because of my doing primarily tax work, I would
also have limited contact with my new employer’s external
auditing firm.
Unfortunately, this would be a pipe dream for me
precisely because Section 206 precludes me from taking the tax
job with the client. As I see it, this is grossly unfair to those
similarly situated young accountants starting out who have not
yet found their professional niche.
15

See Gilmore, supra note 10, at 215.
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This unfortunately cripples young accountants who not
only cannot freely make career choices but are effectively forced
into retroactively paying for corporate misdeeds that happened
while they might have been undergraduates (or younger). And,
those same professionals starting their careers who are now
foreclosed by Section 206 from pursuing viable career
opportunities have no remedy to fix their predicament. This is
just wrong!
D. Another Potential Injustice of Section 206
Let us assume that Jane Doe (fictitious) is a Certified
Public Accountant (“CPA”) who is an audit partner at Deloitte
and Touche (“Deloitte”). Jane has been with the firm for the past
12 years, and has been an audit partner for the past four years.
Jane has developed an unassailable, sterling reputation within the
accounting profession, her clients speak very highly of her, and
her performance evaluations are outstanding. Over the years, she
has participated in the audits of several high profile Deloitte
clients, including AT&T, Cablevision, IBM, General Electric
(“GE”), and Citigroup.
Jane was the lead auditor when Deloitte audited GE in
February 2012. Jane had audited GE on more than one occasion,
and there is absolutely no question of her integrity or her
professionalism. She always maintains a professional demeanor
and there is no question of her independence from her clients. In
addition, we will also assume (for purposes of this discussion, and
I have no reason to believe otherwise) that GE’s internal controls
and accounting practices give an absolutely accurate picture of
the firm’s financial condition.
On July 1, 2012, the CEO of GE offers Jane the position of
CFO, at a salary of $1 million per year, plus bonuses and stock
options. Unfortunately for Jane, through no fault of her own, she
cannot accept GE’s job offer precisely because of the provisions
of Section 206. I believe that this is a grievously unfair, unjust
result. While it is true that Section 206 seeks to strengthen auditor
independence, I strongly believe that Section 206 wrongfully
penalizes innocent people and innocent firms.
First, I believe that Section 206 wrongfully prevents a
person in Jane’s position from making a living consistent with
her academic and professional credentials. What happens if this
was a once in a lifetime offer for Jane’s dream job? She is now cut
off from it because Section 206 is, as I see it, a strict liability
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section. Strict liability means “liability without fault.” 16 If we
apply strict liability to a situation like this, it means that one does
not need to prove that Jane was negligent in accepting the offer,
or that she acted in bad faith, or committed any malfeasance. The
mere fact that Jane accepted the offer within one year of her
auditing General Electric is enough for Section 206 to step in and
keep her from taking the job.
Secondly, what does Jane do in the interim? Once Jane’s
partners at Deloitte find out about her offer from GE, they
probably would not be too happy. The partners could
conceivably vote her out of the partnership, thus constructively
(and actually) firing her. If she were a staff accountant who
wasn’t yet a partner, the firm most likely would have fired her. If
GE truly wants Jane and is willing to wait for her, the company
could give her a signing bonus equal to her annual salary, making
it worthwhile for Jane to wait out the one year period before
actually starting work. A less realistic possibility would be for
Jane to start working for the company immediately, for the same
salary, but at a much lower job than CFO. Imagine the next CFO
working for the firm in the interim as a mailroom clerk, or
receptionist, or executive secretary. Obviously, these are jobs far
beneath Jane’s professional skill set. Otherwise, Jane’s only other
alternatives would be to look for a job in another CPA firm, or a
corporation that she last audited more than one year ago, or look
for a job at Wendy’s putting salt on french fries. Admittedly, my
Wendy’s reference here is an extreme example, but it also points
out a potentially absurd result because of Section 206. Sadly, this
is a situation people in Jane’s position would be forced into as a
result of Section 206.
Thirdly, I am unconvinced that the one year requirement
is necessary. If the client is above board, and the auditor was
both competent and independent in performing the audit, I
cannot think of a better marriage than an upstanding auditor
going to work for an equally upstanding, transparent client. For
me, this is a clear case of both parties having nothing to prove,
and more importantly, even less to hide. In my opinion, there are
not many people that a firm could hire better than an auditor
who recently audited the firm and already knows that the
financial statements are legitimate. The firm would be getting an
employee whose competence, professionalism, and veracity are
proven.
16

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1991).
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It is very unlikely that there would be a reverse situation
where an auditor missed red flags that would have uncovered a
fraud and then goes to work for that same firm later on. The
auditor takes a job with the client as the controller, and while
working as the controller, he notices many accounting
irregularities that he missed while he was the client’s lead
external auditor. When he reports the irregularities to his
superiors, they notify him that he has a choice: either restate the
financial statements and expose himself and his former firm to
malpractice liability, or just keep quiet and go along.
Unfortunately, he is now forced to choose between a bad option
and a worse option.
Of course, if something like that was to happen, the guilty
parties must suffer the consequences. While I understand that the
rationale for Section 206 is well-meaning, I believe for the reasons
stated above that it is overbroad to the point that it wrongly
condemns honest, current practitioners for the “sins of the
fathers,” so to speak. Additionally, Section 206 completely
disregards the fact that there are honest, diligent professionals
who maintain their independence at all times.

III. AUDIT PARTNER ROTATION UNDER SECTION 203
Section 203 of SOX provides the following:
It shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting
firm to provide audit services to an issuer if the lead (or
coordinating)
audit
partner
(having
primary
responsibility for the audit), or the audit partner
responsible for reviewing the audit, has performed audit
services for that issuer in each of the five previous fiscal
years of that issuer. 17
In financial accounting, one of the generally accepted
accounting principles is consistency. Consistency means that “a
company uses the same accounting principles and methods from
year to year.” 18 If a business, along with its accountants, honestly
conducts its affairs the same way every year and is successful
every year, it only makes sense to stick with what works. As the

17
18

2010).

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §203, 15 U.S.C. §78j-1 (2002).
JERRY J. WEYGANDT ET AL., ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES, 274 (10th ed.
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old adage suggests: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” 19
Similarly, if you have an honest company along with an
honest, and independent auditing firm, and the result is a
competent, professional audit and reliable, trustworthy financial
statements, I do not see much sense in putting a time clock on a
good business relationship of veracity and integrity. Thanks to
Section 203, a firm is now required to change its audit partner
every five years. Again, I believe this is overreaching.
I see a couple of potential problems with Section 203.
First, if we take a literal reading of the statute, it becomes illegal
for the same partner to lead audits with the same client for more
than five consecutive years. If that is the case, this presents a
possible scenario where the partner and client can agree after the
fifth year that the partner will step aside in year six, and then
take the reins again in years 7 through 11. Conceivably, the
partner and the firm can have this kind of arrangement in
perpetuity where the partner “takes a year off” every so often and
then comes back. I do not know exactly how ethical this kind of
arrangement might be, but I do not see anything in the statutory
language that would make this arrangement illegal, either.
Next, I also see Section 203 as an unfair constriction of the
freedom to create a contract. In its most basic form, a contract is
an agreement for which the law gives a remedy. 20 “I will do A for
you and you will do B for me.” In the auditor-client relationship,
the auditor will examine various financial aspects of the client’s
business and the client will pay the auditor for the service
provided. That is their contract. As in any transaction, if the
bargained for exchange is satisfactory on all sides, the contracting
parties would conceivably want to do business again in the
future. This is no different in the auditor-client relationship,
which by necessity is to be an arm’s length relationship.
Obviously, I’m not talking about a buddy-buddy relationship like
Enron’s Causey and Andersen’s Duncan, or a situation where a
member of the client’s management is having a romantic affair
with a member of the audit staff. The compromise of auditor
independence in those types of situations goes without saying.
In the typical arm’s length relationship between the

See,
e.g.,
THE
FREE
DICTIONARY,
at
http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/if+it+ain’t+broke,+don’t+fix+it.
20
See, e.g., ROGER LEROY MILLER & GAYLORD A. JENTZ,
FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS LAW 153 (8th ed. 2010) (“A contract is an
agreement that can be enforced in court.”).
19
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auditor and client, the auditor doing an honest, thorough, and
professional job is what will often result in a repeat engagement,
and a good working relationship between the parties. Most often,
the thing that brings clients back every year is doing satisfactory
work and not being a yes-man always telling the clients what
they want to hear. There is any number of good, long standing
contractual relationships where the professionalism and
competence of the parties involved are not compromised, such as
the principal-agent, lawyer-client, doctor-patient, employeremployee, and trustee-beneficiary relationships. The auditorclient relationship should be no different.
I can imagine the outcry that would result if a federal law
was enacted that every person had to change his or her doctor
every five years. The very idea of having one’s proctologist,
oncologist, cardiologist, OB-GYN, etc. on a statutory rotation
basis is nothing short of asinine.
For example, a patient with a chronic disease has been
going to the same doctor for ten years. This doctor has performed
surgery on this patient several times and knows this patient’s
history like the back of his or her hand. Without this doctor the
patient could have died ten years ago, but they have not, because
the patient trusts they are in good hands. The same goes for a
client. Clients do not want to be tossed around to a new auditor
every couple years who does not know who the client is and what
the client has been doing. Clients want to trust their auditors are
competent and thorough. With audit rotation, it limits these
possibilities and causes more harm to all parties involved. 21
Thanks to SOX, this is the very same thing that the law is
requiring of auditing firms and their clients. I believe this result is
just as ridiculous.

IV. POSSIBILITY OF REQUIRED AUDIT ROTATION
Recently, the PCAOB has entertained thoughts about
requiring auditing firms be rotated every few years. 22 While I
agree that the PCAOB is rightly concerned about audit failures

Amy Kennedy, Audit Rotation is Not Beneficial in the Long Run,
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/070_Amy_Kennedy.pdf.
22
See generally Public Corporation Accounting Oversight Board, Concept
Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation, PCAOB Release
No.
2011-006
(August
16,
2011).
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/Release_2011-006.pdf.
21
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and the lack of professional skepticism, 23 I am not wholly
convinced that changing auditing firms every few years is a
viable option.
First, similar to my above discussion about changing audit
partners every five years, I believe that the PCAOB’s thought
about changing audit firms every few years is a bit draconian.
Again, if a client has a good working relationship with its auditor,
and the end result is transparent, reliable financial statements
where no one’s integrity or professionalism is at issue, I do not see
the harm in continuing that relationship for the foreseeable
future.
Another legitimate argument against seemingly endless
auditor rotation is the idea that the client has to perpetually go
back to square one in showing a new auditing firm the ropes.
“The argument that auditor change disrupts the company whose
accounts are being audited has more substance. A new set of
people arriving at every audit location and having to learn the
ropes is likely to be a bit disruptive to well-oiled routines.” 24 I do
not see the efficacy of clients playing “musical chairs” with their
auditors every few years.
Next, SOX has been unambiguous in prohibiting auditing
firms from providing non-audit services to the same clients for
whom they are doing audit work.25 If a large part of the problem
was that supposedly independent auditing firms provided tax,
business consulting and other services to the audit clients, Section
201 of SOX did away with that problem. The general perception
was that auditing firms used their audit work for their clients as a
hook to sell their non-audit services to those same clients.
In my opinion, it is precisely because SOX drew a bright
line between the acceptable and prohibited services that auditors
can now provide for their clients. In other words, Section 201 has
already removed the pressure for auditors to do non-audit work
for their audit clients. Therefore, in my opinion, the idea to rotate
auditing firms is overbroad.

Id. at 6.
Eric Tracy, Arguments Against Auditor Rotation Appear Desperate,
ACCOUNTANCY
AGE,
(June
11,
2012),
available
at
http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/opinion/2183068/arguments-auditorrotation-appear-desperate.
25
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §201, 15 U.S.C. §78j-1 (2002).
23
24
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V. DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS UNDER SECTION 304
Section 304 of SOX provides the following:
(a) ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION PRIOR TO
NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH
COMMISSION
FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS- If an
issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement
due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a
result of misconduct, with any financial reporting
requirement under the securities laws, the CEO and
CFO of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for—
(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based
compensation received by that person from the issuer
during the 12-month period following the first public
issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first
occurs) of the financial document embodying such
financial reporting requirement; and
(2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the
issuer during that 12-month period. 26
Section 302 places the ultimate responsibility for the
veracity of a corporation’s financial information on the CEO and
CFO. 27 Thus, the CEO and CFO must certify that there are no
material misstatements or omissions within the financial
statements, are responsible for the company’s internal controls,
and must promptly report any internal control lapses to the
corporation’s audit committee. 28 In response to the parade of
corporate officers who testified that they were unaware of their
companies’ creative accounting prior to SOX’ enactment, SOX
section 302 seems to be an appropriate response imposing strict
liability on the CEO and CFO if the company’s financial
statements are in fact fraudulent.
Section 304, however, requires only the CEO and CFO to
disgorge their profits if the financial statements are to be
recalculated due to fraud. While it is true that SOX imposes
“buck stopping” sanctions on the CEO and CFO in the spirit of
management accountability, I’m not wholly convinced that
26
27
28

Id. §304, 15 U.S.C. §7243.
Id. §302, 15 U.S.C. §7241.
Id.
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Section 304 is always fairly applied.
If the CEO and CFO knew, or at least had reason to know
that the financial statements were fraudulent, then of course they
should suffer the consequences. However, is it fair for the CEO
and CFO to take the fall for someone else’s defalcation?
Obviously, there is an element of risk assumption when one takes
a position of a Chief Executive or Chief Financial Officer. What
happens if 1) the CEO and CFO perform their jobs competently
and in good faith, and 2) there is very little nexus between top
management and lower level employees who are actually
responsible for the financial statement fraud?
For example, I am a low level accountant for XYZ
Company. I report to the accounts payable manager, who reports
to the controller, who reports to the CFO. XYZ Company is a
publicly traded corporation who generated $600 million in
revenue, and netted $140 million in profits. Unbeknownst to my
supervisors, I generate fictitious invoices payable to various shell
companies, thus embezzling $426,082 from the company.
Compared to $140 million, what is a mere $426,082?
Although I was able to steal over four hundred thousand
dollars right under my company’s nose, the company’s profits are
understated because of my fraud. Additionally, the company’s
employees all receive year-end bonus checks in varying amounts,
including the CFO, who receives a $250,000 bonus. Even though
I perpetrated the fraud, I even received a bonus of $500.
Assuming my fraud is ultimately discovered, and the
financial statements are restated as a result. The CFO, through
no fault of his own, has to repay his $250,000 back to XYZ
Company. Ironically, Section 304 does not have a similar
disgorgement requirement for any employee other than the CEO
and CFO. Thus, I the embezzler, would keep my $500 bonus
check. Of course, there are many other remedies that the
company can pursue against me (both criminally and in tort); I
am not suggesting that I could walk away untouched. Just the
same, however, I believe Section 304 can produce an unduly
harsh, unfair result where the CFO takes the hit for my misdeeds.
The punishment just does not fit the crime.
If the CFO in this hypothetical can prove by the
preponderance of the evidence that he exercised due diligence,
and a reasonable investigation would not have uncovered my
theft, then the CFO should not have to return his bonus to the
corporation. As a low level accountant, I probably would not
have much contact with the controller, and even less contact with
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the CFO. If there is practically no nexus between myself and the
CFO, I cannot see the justification for the CFO being penalized
by my thievery, especially if the CFO did his job within the rules.
If I have a good working knowledge of my company’s
internal control devices, I can plan my embezzlement in such a
way that I stay within the firm’s internal control parameters. As
long as I am under the radar, my activities would not raise any
red flags during an internal or external audit. Again, I believe
that it is grossly unfair for the CFO to take the fall for something
that was my own creation that had nothing to do with him.

VI. CONCLUSION
I have shown several examples where certain provisions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley statute could unintentionally lead to harsh
results. To be fair, the massive corporate accounting scandals the
country had been exposed to necessitated a legislative response.
As such, I do not suggest that SOX has been a failure. In key
areas, I believe that SOX has been successful. First, corporate
managers retain the ultimate responsibility for the information
submitted to the general public. Secondly, SOX has mandated
that auditors just do audit work and nothing else for their audit
clients. 29 Thus, SOX has been fairly successful.
Have some people slipped through the cracks and not
lived up to the level of professional skepticism? 30 Unfortunately,
yes. In those cases, the firms in question were properly sanctioned
for their part in their audit failures. That said, can we
automatically assume that the professional integrity of all
auditing firms is for sale to the highest bidder? I think not. Are all
auditing firms “in bed” with their clients? As was seen with
Arthur Andersen and Enron, unfortunately some are. However, I
believe, perhaps naïvely, that most auditors are not in bed with
Daniel L. Goelzer, Auditing Under Sarbanes-Oxley: An Interim Report,
7 BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 3 (2006).
30
See, e.g, Richard Crump, Baker Tilly criticised for lack of professional
scepticism, ACCOUNTANCY AGE, (May 10, 2012), available at
http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/2173716/baker-tilly-criticised-lackprofessional-scepticism; Michael Foster, PCAOB Fines Ernst & Young $2
Million, BIG 4, (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.big4.com/ernstyoung/pcaob-fines-ernst-young-2-million/.
29
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their clients. What I really take exception to is the unspoken
perception that auditors are automatically either compromised or
on the take. This is similar to the general perception of attorneys
as nothing more than unethical hired guns, which I think is just
as inaccurate.
Thus, in the Congressional haste to come up with an
appropriate response to Enron, World-Com, Tyco, and the rest, I
believe that SOX committed a touch of overkill in the pursuit of
accounting integrity. As shown above, this overkill takes the form
of unjustly penalizing current professionals for someone else’s
prior misdeeds. In certain instances, the “punishment” does not a
fit the crime. I do not believe that the legislative intent was to
impose overly harsh restrictions on financial reporting.
Unfortunately though, Sections 203, 206, and 304 lend themselves
to certain situations where an individual can suffer inequitable
consequences for someone else’s misconduct. And adding injury
to insult, the individual forced to retroactively pay for someone
else’s financial crimes has no legal recourse. Not only is this
unfair, but the fact that these “loopholes” have not been
adequately addressed in the ten-plus years of Sarbanes-Oxley’s
existence guarantees that the hidden unfairness of a supposedly
remedial statute will continue unabated.

